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I. Observations
1. Introductory remarks. An outline of the security and prevention issue
a. Originally, 'security' referred to protection with respect to outside dangers or the 
general absence of dangers. With time, this term acquired a more limited and spe-
cific meaning: on the one hand, it is a state characterised by the absence of civil 
insecurity understood as the absence of disorder, risks or threat of disorder; on the 
other hand, it is a specific field of intervention aimed at maintaining public order. Civil  
insecurity, however, does not constitute a consensual notion. For some, it is a con-
crete experience (criminality, victimisation), and for others, it is an indirect experience 
conveyed by the media. Furthermore, the 'feeling of insecurity' associated with in-
security may be a 'fear of crime' or an uneasiness related to the loss of social cohe-
sion or, more broadly, to social insecurity. Insecurity is therefore a social creation. 
Furthermore, many studies show that insecurity and the feeling of insecurity are not 
related.
b. Issues related to insecurity were quickly reduced to petty and more serious urban 
crime, to which 'uncivil behaviour' and 'public disorder' have been added. Besides 
the fact that it places entire disputes in the background, this reduction has the effect 
of localising public mechanisms for combating insecurity and of focalising them on 
public spaces or spaces which are accessible to the public.
c. Along with the difficulty of understanding 'what insecurity is', there is also the 
difficulty of determining the solutions to this phenomenon, as they are often based 
on notions which are themselves polysemous. This is the case of 'prevention', 
which is a key issue in public policies. Although it seems to be a consensual inter-
vention category, its translation into mechanisms leads to theoretical and practical 
problems. It allows highly varied mechanisms to be grouped together, including po-
lice saturation of a neighbourhood, community mediation and street workers. The 
risk of contamination of more 'social' actions by more 'penal' actions is therefore 
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very real. Furthermore, this vagueness has the consequence of overshadowing rela-
tions with the repression they are confronted with all too often.
d. Although insecurity justifies various policies and mechanisms, in most cases their 
evaluation only concerns their effectiveness and not their effects, impact or perti-
nence. This leads us to an observation of incapacity: it is not possible to provide a 
global and detailed view of the security situation in Brussels. The available figures 
(police statistics and victimisation study) refer to police action or provide a monolithic 
account without enabling a fine distinction to be made between different types of 
victimisation. 
These limits, as well as the scope of our subject, have led us focus on the policies 
and mechanisms presented as having to provide a response to insecurity and/or the 
feeling of insecurity. We have also left out exclusively penal policies and mecha-
nisms, as they come within the remit of the federal government, which goes beyond 
the scope of this summary.
2. Specificity of Brussels as regards security issues
The same questions arise in all big cities and have an influence on security issues. 
Furthermore, Brussels is a special case, as the Belgian and European capital, a bi-
lingual region, a main communications hub and major producer of wealth. There are 
major security problems related to the mobility of workers (commuters, road safety, 
etc.), the movements of populations (immigration, international crime, etc.), eco-
nomic activities (financial, tax and environmental crime) and the maintenance of or-
der related to (inter)national institutions and European summits. 
The complexity of the situation in Brussels is also due to the local context. As it did 
not go along with the amalgamation of local authorities movement in 1977, to this 
day Brussels remains a patchwork of 19 municipalities which are highly contrasted 
from a political, geographic, spatial, demographic, socioeconomic and ethnic point 
of view. This contrast has become even more apparent since the transformation of 
19 municipal police forces into 6 local police areas made up of 2 to 5 municipalities, 
without justifying these groupings according to the type of criminality or socioeco-
nomic or urbanistic characteristics.
However, contrary to what one may think, the situation in Brussels in terms of secu-
rity is stable. Crime rates are not increasing. The rate of victimisation is of course 
relatively high, but the analysis of figures shows that although criminal offences are 
rather frequent, their seriousness is relative: 57% of reported offences are thefts and 
extortions,1 whereas only 7% are malicious injuries. The figures related to the feeling 
of insecurity are however higher than in the other regions: 18.6% of the inhabitants 
of Brussels state that they always or often have a feeling of insecurity, compared 
with 7% in Flanders and 11% in Wallonia.
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3. Mechanisms in terms of security and prevention 
There are many policies in Brussels which deal directly with security issues. This 
situation has two effects. 
On the one hand, in addition to local policies (federal and municipal grants), grants 
exist at all levels of authority in Brussels: federal and/or regional for security policies 
strictly speaking (security contracts, Brussels prevention contracts, European sum-
mit contracts, administrative sanctions contracts); community, related to aid and 
protection provided to youth; and European, federal, regional and local, related to 
the urban regulation and renewal policy (big city contracts, neighbourhood contracts 
and shopping area contracts, or local, regional or federal tailor-made projects, all of 
which are supposed to have an impact in terms of security) (see annexe 1). 
On the other hand, the diversity of mechanisms is considerable despite their com-
mon characteristics: 
• A will to integrate security and social approaches by attempting to link them 
together via coordination, dialogue and partnership mechanisms.
• Increasing importance given to the issues of 'uncivil behaviour' and 'public 
nuisance' rather than to 'criminality'.
• Emphasising the accountability of members of the 'community'.
• The appearance of new hybrid functions combining security and social as-
pects (park guards, security and prevention agents, etc.).
• A territorialisation of mechanisms on a neighbourhood basis.
These mechanisms may be classified according to their essential objectives as de-
fined by those in charge of the projects:
a. Proximity mechanisms aimed at bringing public services closer to the 
population
The interfaces between the population and administration or local authorities: police 
stations, legal centres, local administration, municipal mediation centres, dialogue 
assistants, ombudsmen, etc.
Proximity functions, for the surveillance of public spaces and to reassure the popula-
tion and improve contact with it: neighbourhood police, community policing and 
urban stewards.
b. The development of physical environments
In order to reduce the occurrence of a problem by favouring security through ade-
quate development (better urban lighting, protection of defenceless users of public 
thoroughfares, bins, dog waste areas, urinals, etc.), or in order to develop public 
space (green spaces, playgrounds, sports facilities, etc.). This category also in-
cludes 'techno-prevention' (bicycle coding, security premiums, visit following a rob-
bery, etc).
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c. The surveillance of territories
Three types of surveillance are favoured in general:
• Human surveillance by local stakeholders.
• Technical surveillance: this mainly involves the installation of surveillance cam-
eras in public thoroughfares, in certain strategic places.
• Surveillance by the inhabitants of a neighbourhood: very rare in Brussels (RIQ 
– Réseaux d'information de quartier).
d. The quality of life and social ties
In order to improve life in neighbourhoods, social housing or schools by reinforcing 
social ties through the improvement of the physical and/or social environment, sev-
eral approaches have been developed:
• Creation of structures allowing inhabitants to live together and to have com-
mon projects (community centres, youth centres, outreach work in the streets 
or neighbourhood, etc.)
• Conflict resolution: school, social, neighbourhood, debt, etc. mediation serv-
ices
• Neighbourhood dialogue 
• Creation of local employment: urban stewards, cleaning or small repairs, so-
ciocultural activity leaders, etc.
• Urban renewal and revitalisation of neighbourhoods
e. Suppression of uncivil behaviour
Municipal administrative fines or systems based on a taxing of undesirable behav-
iour aimed at the suppression of uncivil behaviour. Today, these systems are very 
widespread (their concrete use is presented in MEERSCHAUT et al. 2008).
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II. Questions-issues
1. The lack of evaluation
A trustworthy and relevant instrument providing an overall picture of Brussels and a 
detailed view of the localisation of security problems does not exist. Not only is there 
a glaring lack of figures, but, when they do exist, they do not allow a measurement 
of the true state of insecurity (neither criminality nor the feeling of insecurity).
Furthermore, on the one hand, near-experimental evaluative research does not exist 
in Brussels (based on a 'before/after' or 'here/there' evaluation) which would allow 
the causal link to be established between a mechanism and the expected results. 
On the other hand, external evaluations centred on impact or the pertinence of ac-
tions are gradually being replaced by 'internal' evaluations which mainly monitor 
compliance with obligations related to the various grants and the use of financial 
means. Therefore, no precise information can be provided as regards the effective-
ness of public action in Brussels in terms of security.
2. Difficulty to consider security policies in a more global context (well-being)
The unrealistic idea of Brussels as a dangerous city has led certain stakeholders to 
develop a security project for the city based on a squared territory under permanent 
surveillance, preferably with the presence of the police force, and aimed at the con-
trol of problematic behaviour.
One of the most disturbing changes in this area is the development of 'techno-
prevention', which has not really been called into question. The increase in the 
number of cameras significantly modifies the status of public spaces and life in the 
city for the populations who live there. It favours the idea of security not as some-
thing which ensues from the peaceful and harmonious cohabitation of different 
populations, but as a state of surveillance. In this area, the distinction between reas-
surance (feeling of insecurity) and action to combat criminality (security) is particu-
larly important.
3. Difficulty to consider policies specifically for Brussels
In Brussels, there is clearly a problem with the coordination and coherence of vari-
ous actions, which is still accentuated by the recent division of territories and 
authorities in charge of defining and evaluating policies to prevent criminality, as well 
as local police policies. 
In this context, let us also mention the difficult position of Brussels in terms of police 
recruitment, which takes place mainly outside Brussels. The recruits are posted at 
the beginning of their career for a very short period of time (usually two years) in a 
city they do not know or necessarily like, and whose problems they do not truly un-
derstand. The police force therefore lacks staff who really know the city and make a 
long-term commitment to it.
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4. Difficulty to consider security at the level of the city
More and more often, security policies are based on territorial units represented by 
neighbourhoods. Their coherence is not called into question, thus favouring a frag-
mented view of the city and its problems and policies to be implemented, and the 
phenomena resulting from the overall balance in the city escape analysis. Further-
more, rather than viewing insecurity as a product of a given urban configuration, this  
vision tends to point a finger at the presence of foreign elements, or at least ele-
ments which cause problems within the social fabric.
5. The lack of means
Brussels faces special restrictions in terms of security, whose costs are difficult for 
the city to meet. Inflation in recent decades, police tasks and police officers are very 
expensive for Brussels. On the other hand, the shortage of police officers remains a 
particularly sensitive issue, due to obligations in terms of bilingualism or heavier 
workloads. Brussels therefore lacks the means to develop its own security approach 
and to meet its specific obligations.
This lack of means also has effects on the proposed policies. The police reform 
which reduced the ascendancy of local authorities over the police led the municipali-
ties to hire new staff to ensure part of the maintenance of local order. There was 
therefore a gradual shift of certain police tasks to urban stewards (community polic-
ing and observation of uncivil behaviour) or to private stakeholders (management of 
ticket machines), without questioning this shift as regards service quality or ambigu-
ity in terms of competence.
6. Increase in the number of unclear and uncertain functions
The dispersal of mechanisms and sources of funding not only leads to problems in 
terms of coherence, but also to an increase in functions in the field. The result is a 
nebula of institutional or community social workers with various titles related to se-
curity issues, struggling to work together.
This situation presents two major problems. The first is that of unclear functions and 
the absence of a regulatory framework, which forces stakeholders to constantly 
'invent' their practices without being sure that they will be recognised. These func-
tions are defined concretely at (micro)local level, which leads to a great variation in 
practices. The second problem is related to the high level of mobility of staff involved 
in these mechanisms, which compromises the long-term accumulation of experi-
ence and knowledge. This mobility is due in particular to the unattractive salaries for 
the functions concerned and their uncertain nature as a result of risks related to the 
renewal of grants and unattractive statuses (fixed-term or part-time contracts, un-
certain status related to social aid programmes). 
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7. Municipal administrative fines
Municipal administrative fines were initially presented as a means of widening the 
capacities of municipal authorities by allowing them to define their own local security 
policies through the incrimination of public nuisance, but soon proved to be incon-
sistent.  
In terms of policy coherence, there is a lack of harmonisation among neighbouring 
municipalities, which leads to absurd situations, especially from the point of view of 
police who work in several territories.
In terms of autonomy, the application of the administrative fines mechanism to 
mixed offences (administrative and penal) depends to a large extent on the local 
police and the public prosecutor's department. The former has the authority to de-
termine offences and identify those who commit them, and the latter may prevent 
the municipalities from applying the mechanism for these types of offence; in the 
district of Brussels, this is always the case for petty theft, which therefore cannot be 
subject to municipal administrative action.
Municipal autonomy is therefore very relative, especially since the mechanism is now 
presented as an essential element of municipal security policy. More and more, mu-
nicipalities are called to implement it in order not to appear to tolerate disorder, 
which could have a negative effect on criminality and lead to an intervention of the 
(federal) penal system, which would be costly for taxpayers.
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III. Policy options
1. Figures, evaluation and rationalisation
Brussels must develop a system to evaluate security problems as well as the impact 
and relevance of policies. It must therefore take as wide a scope as possible into 
account, encompassing everything from local diagnostics to the most general con-
sequences of actions undertaken. A Brussels observatory for security and the pre-
vention of criminality has been proposed2. It should be one of the evaluation tools 
and should be complemented by an ambitious strategy for long-term funding of 
regular external evaluations by independent bodies.
While it is important to evaluate impacts, it is also necessary to specify the expected 
effects and resulting costs before the creation of new mechanisms. This involves the 
establishment of follow-up methods when projects are in their initial phases. 
2. Going beyond the notion of security policies to the benefit of city policies
If we accept a broad view of the notion of security and the idea that many types of 
public action are concerned, it is necessary to revise the very structure of the poli-
cies being considered. It would be advisable to leave the security policies based on 
the maintenance of order to the federal authorities (Ministry of the Interior) as much 
as possible to fully integrate security into the city's policies as a whole. The Flemish 
Region has set an example with its analysis in 'Witboek stedenbeleid. Over stadsre-
publieken en rastersteden'. The Walloon Region has also attempted to move in this 
direction, with its Prevention and Proximity Plans (PPP).
The authors therefore recommend a true urban project centred on the notion of 
well-being as a way of taking the security problem seriously as well as the social 
problems it reveals. This evolution involves the establishment of a precise inventory 
of current initiatives and subsidisation methods.
3. Competences of the different levels of authority
The institutional complexity of Brussels is major problem. This situation does not 
necessarily call for a radical simplification. The diversity of the levels of authority al-
lows interventions on behalf of the most adequate levels. This requires taking into 
consideration the appropriate level for public action.
Therefore, if the neighbourhood level is appropriate for developing certain policies, it 
cannot be the only level taken into account for security issues. A municipal, regional 
and even national balance must be considered. Brussels must therefore develop 
specific policies for the city considered as a whole, and even participate in defining 
policies concerning its surroundings.
In this context, it is necessary to question the possible role played by the Region 
regarding coordination (e.g. municipal administrative sanctions) and the stimulation 
of stakeholders in the field. In the same way, it is essential for part of the efforts to 
be centred on the elaboration of a true policy of knowledge in terms of security.
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Finally, the Region must become a negotiator in managing the mobility of police 
staff.
4. Funding of security policies specific to Brussels
It is a logical result of the special position of Brussels and the ensuing specific costs 
that the funding of security policies and police in the Region must be re-evaluated. 
This issue is part of the more general problem of funding for the Region.
5. A stabilisation of public policies in terms of security
The uncertainty of functions created in the framework of security policies poses a 
problem. It is important to define these functions more precisely and to evaluate 
them carefully, as well as stabilise those which have received a positive evaluation. It 
is also just as essential to stabilise the situation of staff.
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The mechanisms for preventing criminality and combating insecurity in Brussels
Source : FRANSSEN, SMEETS (2008)
Police policies







Federal Definition of the police 
contribution integrated 
into the federal crime 
policy   
Federal police: priority missions and objectives and distribution of human 
and material resources









Police policy for local 
police
Local police:
Priority missions and objectives 
Capacity to carry out criminal police and administrative police missions
Contribution of local police in carrying out federal missions
Possible missions and objectives specific to a municipality in the area
Urban security policies
Type Since Funds* General objectives Projects/specific objectives
Security contracts 
(Belgium)












Fight against urban inse-
curity and fear of crime
Police
(until 2002)
Modernisation of local police 
Neighbourhood police (community policing and de-
centralisation of police stations)
Youth and social police brigades
Improving relations between police officers and immi-
grants (dialogue assistants)
Improvement of assistance




Social Youth centres and outreach work
Community centres and social mediation
Centre for drug addicts
Centre for the homeless 
Situational preven-
tion
Surveillance of public spaces (urban stewards); public 
lighting; video surveillance
Victim support Assistance to victims 
Legal assistance
(1996) Justice Support for alternative measures  
Insecurity and 
criminality analysis















2003 Federal Ensure security during 
European summits
Hiring of local public security agents (non police agents)
Financing of police overtime
Language training for police officers





15 municipalities in 
Belgium, the city of 
Brussels











The implementation of 
municipal administrative 
sanctions
Hiring of a 'sanction agent'
*Public funds and grants (administration levels)
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Urban regulation policies
Type of contract Since Funds* General objectives Projects/specific objectives
Neighbourhood 
contracts (Brussels)








Social revitalisation of 
neighbourhoods 
Rehabilitation and renova-
tion of public spaces and 
buildings
Rehabilitation of existing housing and creation of new housing 
Embellishment and renovation of public spaces
Creation of neighbourhood facilities (children's centres, community centres, 
sports halls, local associations)
Development of local employment








Increase the dynamism 
and attractiveness of the 
shopping areas
Creation of activities (encourage new businesses, assistance for shop 
signs, etc)
Renovation of public spaces and accessibility (construction of accommo-
dations, neighbourhood access, social mix and coordinated interventions 
of public services)
Attractiveness (embellishment of the neighbourhood)
Big cities contracts 
(Belgium)
7 municipalities in 
Brussels
2000 Federal Improve the quality of life, 
living conditions, safety 
and economic revival of 
cities
Compensate for social 
insufficiencies of disad-
vantaged populations
Urban renewal  (40% of budget) 
Cultural and sports activities
Presence in public spaces
Prevention at school and elimination of illiteracy
Social integration and creation of local employment
Improving cleanliness
Flemish Cities Fund 
(Flanders and Brus-
sels)












Fighting dualism in cities
Improving the quality of 
life




Urban 1 and 2 
(Europe)
3 municipalities in 
Brussels (1994), 5 
municipalities in 







Social and economic 
revitalisation of neigh-
bourhoods
1994: Development of business centres, local economy desks, social 
economy enterprises and neighbourhood infrastructures (internet access 
points, community centres, sports centres, etc)   
2000: Development of neighbourhood infrastructures and facilities (cultural 
centres, employment centres, community centres, etc) 
Renovation of industrial wastelands 
Access to new technologies and e-administration 
Local development (creativity workshops for youth, etc)
URBACT 1 and 2
(Europe)











ployment and social 
cohesion
Creation of networks and working groups for the exchange of knowledge 
and practices between cities in the urban programme
